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2Thomas J. Sargent"
This paperdescribes two ways ofrationalizing the large net-ofinterest
deficits experienced by the U.S. during the Reagan Administration. Both
ofthese rationalizations imply that U.S. government expenditures are
destined to fall relative to their pre-Reagan path.
Figures on government deficits are difficult to
interpret because the economically relevant budget
constraint is an intertemporal one. As such, it
restricts the present value of a sequence ofgovern-
mentdeficits butnotthe size ofdeficits for particular
years or even for long strings of years. For any
observed string ofgovernmentdeficits, there always
exists a string of prospective future surpluses that
renders the budget in balance in the present value
sense.
By alluding to prospects for future government
surpluses, anyone can therefore assert that a record
of observed deficits is consistent with maintaining
sound government credit and a stable government
currency. Several years ofbig deficits by themselves
therefore fail to indicate that the entire sequence of
government budgets is out of balance. This fact
opens recent deficit figures for the United States to
alternative interpretations, some hopeful, others
foretelling doom.
* Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, and Professor ofEconomics, University
of Minnesota. I received helpful comments on an
earlier draft from Randy Pozdena, Michael Keeley
and Carl Walsh.
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This paper tries to rationalize the large net-of-
interest deficits in the federal budget of the United
States that have marked the Reagan Administration.
I take for granted that the recent deficits are tempo-
rary and that they foretell future government sur-
pluses. I spend no time discussing the view that the
deficits are simply a mistake, a failure ofpolicy, or
the result of shortsightedness or ignorance of the
intertemporal government budget constraint. In-
stead I focus on alternative interpretations ofrecent
events that are consistent with George Stigler's
vision that all agents in a social system are rational
and purposeful. I seek to explain the fiscal and
monetary actions observed during the Reagan
administration as reflecting the optimal decisions of
government policymakers.
There will be one equation in the background of
my discussion, one whose validity is granted by all
competing theories ofmacroeconomics. This equa-
tion is the intertemporal government budget con-
straint. It states that, at any moment, the value of
interest-bearing gov~mmentdebtis equalto the sum
oftwo terms: the presentvalueoffuture government
surpluses net of interest, and the present value of
future government revenues from printing currency
(seignorage revenues).Presumably, the governmentdeficit net ofinterest
and the revenues from currency creation are con-
trolled by separate and independent agencies ofthe
U. S. government. However, in a recurrent and stra-
tegic sense, independence is not feasible. Because
revenues from printing currency are one component
ofthe governmentbudgetconstraint, the notion that
there can be truly independent monetary and fiscal
authorities is a myth.
Arithmetic makes the strategies ofthe monetary
and fiscal authorities interdependent. 1 Classic rec-
ommendations for the conduct of monetary policy,
such as Friedman's (1959) k-percent growth rule for
currency or the gold standard, are well understood
as coordination rules for monetary and fiscal policy.
For these coordination rules to be feasible, the
intertemporal government budget restraint must be
respected. Throughoutthis paper, I will assume that
a version ofFriedman's k-percent coordination rule
(one with a small value ofk) is followed.
I seek to interpret the following observations
about monetary and fiscal policy during the Reagan
years: astringoflargeannual net-of-interestgovern-
ment deficits accompanied by a monetary policy
stance that has been tight, especially before Febru-
ary 1985, and even more so before August 1982. I
take as indicators oftight monetary policy high real
rates of interest on U.S. government debt and pre-
tax yields that exceed the growth rate of the econ-
omy. (Real rates of this magnitude imply that the
interest-bearing government debt is growing rela-
tive to the size of the economy unless the net-of-
interest government budget is in sufficient surplus.)
I take for granted that the string of net-of-interest
government deficits and tight monetary policies
(low rates of seignorage production) cannot both
continue forever, simply because they would violate
the intertemporal government budget constraint.2
I shall describe two rationalizations of recent
observationson governmentpolicy, eachofwhich is
consistent with the government budget constraint,
under the hypothesis of"rational expectations" and
the presumption that the government as a whole is
committed to a monetary regime with low inflation
rates over the long haul. The last stipulation is
equivalentto an assumptionthat the presentvalue of
seignorage in the government budget restraint is
taken for granted to be small.
I. Barro Tax Smoothing
The first rationalization is constructed by apply-
ing the optimal tax smoothing model of Robert
Barro (1979). I assume that the monetary authorities
are committed to supplying little or no seignorage,
and that this is beyond dispute. It follows therefore
that the present value of seignorage is small.
Because of the government budget constraint, the
net-of-interest government budget must be in sur-
plus in present value by an amount equal to the
current value of interest-bearing government debt.
How can this implication be reconciled with the
string of large net-of-interest deficits observed dur-
ing the Reagan administration? Barro's model sup-
plies a possible answer.
Barro's model oftax smoothing can be thought of
as a reinterpretation of Milton Friedman's (1956)
model ofpermanent income as developed by Robert
E. Hall (1978).3 The permanent income model of
consumption confronts a consumer with an
exogenous process for labor income and a constant
real rate of return on savings. The consumer has
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preferences over a long horizon that can be repre-
sentedas adiscountedsumofacurrentperiod utility
function that depends on current consumption
alone. That is, preferences are additively time-sepa-
rable, and the utility function is concave in current
consumption.
Hall shows that for adiscountfactor equalling the
reciprocal of the gross interest rate on assets, the
marginal utility of consumption follows a random
walk. To the extent that the marginal utility of
consumption is approximately linear in consump-
tion, consumption itself may approximately follow
arandom walk. As Hallhas stressed, for any income
process, no matter how unsmooth, the model pre-
dicts that consumption is approximately a random
walk. This means that at every point in time, future
consumption is expected to be approximately con-
stant.
Hall's model precisely represents the consump-
tion-smoothing idea present in Friedman's ongmal
work on the consumption function. A possibly veryunsmooth laborincome process is used to support a
consumption process whose future is expected at
each point in time to be perfectly smooth. Borrow-
ing and lending are used to convert an unsmooth
income path into a smooth consumption path. At
any time, the meanofthe consumptionpath is set so
that the present value of consumption equals the
presentvalue oflaborincome plus initial nonhuman
assets.
Barro can be regarded as having changed the
names ofthe variables in Hall's model and applied
them to government. In place of the household
budget constraint, Barro uses the government bud-
get constraint. What was the exogenous labor
income process in the Friedman model becomes an
exogenous process for government purchases. What
was consumption in the household budget con-
straint becomes total tax collections in Barro's
model. What were household assets become the
stock of interest-bearing government debt. The
interest rate confronting the household in Hall's
model becomes the interest rate at which the gov-
ernment can borrow and lend in Barro's model.
The intertemporal version of the re-interpreted
budgetconstraintis preciselythe intertemporal gov-
ernment budget constraint described above, with
seignorage assumed to have a present value ofzero.
In place of the preference function used by Hall,
Barro uses an additively time-separable loss func-
tion measuring distortions from taxing. The current
period loss function is convex in total tax collec-
tions.
Barro poses the problem of a government that
faces an exogenous and given stochastic process for
government purchases and that chooses a tax strat-
egy to minimize the expected discounted value of
losses from tax distortions. In mathematical terms,
this model is equivalent to Hall's consumption
model, with the change of variables described
above. Itfollows that the model gives the result that
optimally, total tax collections should follow a ran-
dom walk. That is, in the face of an unsmooth
government expenditure stream, tax collections
should be smoothed. In this way, distortions are
allocatedovertime in a way to minimize the present
value of the distortion.
We note that this result depends critically on the
feature ofthe loss function that the distortionattime
t is assumed to depend only on total tax collections
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at t, and not on future tax collections, as would
occur in a model in which private agents are spec-
ulating about future government tax collections. In
Barro's model, expected future tax collections are
set equalto current tax collections, with current tax
collections set to satisfy the intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint.
The Barro model can be used to rationalize the
observed deficits of the Reagan Administration as
part of an optimal tax smoothing response to an
"innovation" aboutthepresentvalueofgovernment
expenditures that arrived coincidentally with
Reagan's election.
Assume that the election of Reagan signalled a
downward revision in the size of the U.S. govern-
ment, as measured by the expected present value of
federal expenditures. Assume further that the path
ofreductions, compared to the path that could have
been expected prior to Reagan, was skewed toward
the future or "back-loaded". Thatis, the election of
Reagan meant reductions in the government expen-
ditures could be expected to take place gradually
overtime, withlargerreductionsinthe future thanin
the present.
Given such a change in the path of expected
government expenditures at the start of the Reagan
administration, Barro's tax smoothing model pre-
dicts that the (optimal) response ofthe government
would be an immediate permanent reduction oftax
collections, relative to the pre-Reagan path. The
consequence of these immediate reductions would
be a string of deficits while expenditures remained
high, to be followed by a string of net-of-interest
government surpluses after the reductions in
expected government expenditures had been real-
ized.
According to this scenario, there is nothing
pathological about the large deficits we have
observed. Instead, they are to be interpreted as the
result ofoptimal tax smoothing by the federal gov-
ernment. Note that Barro's argument implies that
the, Reagan Administration should have tried for a
25 percent reduction in tax rates at one shot, rather
than the 5-10-10 phasing in overthree years embod-
ied in the Kemp-Roth tax legislation.
Barro's model implies that the large deficits
observed pose no inflationary threat because they
pose no danger of being monetized subsequently.
The fact that the interest-bearing U.S. governmentdebthas grown underReagan is merely a signal that
the budget will swing into surplus sometime in the
future, and that government expenditures are des-
tined to fall relative to their pre-Reagan path.
The scenario described on a
controversial aspect of Barro's specification of the
function measuring the current loss from distortion
in the government's objective function. In particu-
Barro spl~ci'ties thatthe currentdistortion at time
t depends only on current tax collections, and is not
a function ofthe public's expectation offuture taxes
set by the government. This feature is critical in
giving rise to the random walk characterization of
taxes, which is at the heart of our interpretation of
the Reagan deficits. It is also crucial in rendering
Barro's solution of the optimal tax problem time-
consistent.4
H()w<~ver, in models in which there is capital,
either or human, the current distortion
from taxation at time t typically depends in part on
people's expectations about future taxes. In making
investment look and respond to
the government's strategy for taxing in the future.
about future taxes therefore distort
decisions.5 Such distortions would alter
Barro's loss function in a way that would make it
sul)o~)til1[lal if tax collections followed a random
walk. It would also render the solution of the opti-
mal tax problem time-inconsistent. Various admin-
istrations over time would therefore be
unable to carry out any solutllon.
As it turns out, when optimal tax are
solved for systems with physical or human capital,
the tax usually is far from a random
walk Usually high taxes are called for
in the lower taxes in the
future. Since taxes now are imposed on exist-
and is inelastic
the taxes take onalump sumcharacter. As
such current taxes should be imposed
to minimize the value ofdistortions.
future taxes, in contrast, do distort
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investment decisions and therefore future values of
capitaL As a result, they should be used sparingly.
The assymmetry in attitude toward current and
future taxes on capital is at the heart of the time
inconsistency of the as well as
suboptimality oftax smoothing.
In summary, by restricting the nature ofthe func-
tion that is assumed to measure the losses from the
distortions that taxes Barro was able to
create a model calling for "tax-smoothing". By tax-
smoothing, he meant even if government
eXI)erldH:un~s were to vary in the future, it
would be optimal for consumers to expect taxes to
remain unchanged. Applied to the current situation
in the U.S. (supposing that the election of Ronald
Reagan signallea that government expenditures
would fall relative to their pre-Reagan path), the
model rationalizes astringofdeficits like the one we
have experienced. Not only does the model
"explain" those deficits, butit also implies thatthey
are not signs of a "problem". Rather, the current
deficits are simply a "signal" offuture reductions in
the path ofgovernment expenditures.
This application of Barra's model is attractive
because it explains many aspects of the current
situation and supports a sanguine interpretation of
recent U.S. deficits. However, such an application
is not beyond criticism for reasons alluded to above.
In particular, the restrictions on the loss function
measuring distortions in Barro's model are very
strong ones. Indeed, the restrictions suppress any
"supply side" effects flowing from expectations
about future taxes to current decisions.
I now turn to an alternative interpretation, one
due to Neil Wallace. Wallace's interpretation hinges
on the observation that economic policymaking in
the United States is decentralized over a variety of
agencies, and that cannot
be reduced without a struggle among those agen-
cies. Wallace's explanation makes the deficit an
instrument in that struggle.Wallace's Game of Chicken
Wallace's interpretation assumes that the"game"
played by government policy authorities has a dif-
ferent structure from that assumed. by Barro. In
particular, Wallace has interpreted monetary and
fiscal policy during the Reagan Administration as
unfolding like a game of chicken among distinct
branches of government with different preferences
about the size of the U.S. federal government.6 In
this game ofchicken, reducing the present value of
gover:nnl1errt expenditures is not a but instead
is the objective of one of the participants in the
game. This objective, in tum, is actually opposed by
anotherplayer. The players' weapons consistoftheir
separate authorities to set paths for government
expenditures, tax collections, and currency crea-
tion. Using Wallace's analogy, the Reagan Admin-
istration plays the game for the purpose ofreducing
the present value ofgovernment expenditures - an
objective whose attainment Barro's explanation
took for h"un',-".
The game of chicken is played among
decentralized branches of government that control
separate elements of the government budget con-
straint. There is a tax authority, whose role I shall
assign to the Reagan Administration, and whose
responsibility is to selecta stochastic process for tax
collections. There is a government expenditure
authority, here assigned to Congress, that deter-
mines the stream of government eX!Jerlditures.
Finally, there is a central bank (the Federal Reserve
System) that determines a time stream of currency
and thereby controls the present value ofseignorage
that appears in the government budget constraint.
While these three players, the tax authority, the
eX!Jeuldlture authority, and the monetary authority,
must coordinatetheirstrategies because arith-
metic ofthe intertemporal government budget con-
straint, they are not forced to do so on a day-to-day
basis by any formal legal Of constitutional mecha-
nism. The coordination ofmonetary and fiscal
icy in the United States is not governed by a set of
well-understood, recurrently applied, or explicit
rules. Instead, policy actions seemto emerge from a
process that is decentralized across institutions
(Congress, President, and Federal Reserve) and
spread over time through a succession of admin-
istrations and personalities. This decentralization
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opens the way to the playing of what Neil Wallace
has characterized as a game of chicken.
In the game of chicken being played
Reagan Administration, the tax and
authorities jointly desire a reduction in the present
value of government expenditures (something they
do not control) as well as a stable price
expenditure authority is assumed to desire a larger
government in the sense ofa largerexpected
value ofgovernment expenditures than does the tax
authority.
To achieve its objective, suppose that the tax
authority plays the game as follows. It achieves a
once-and-for-all reduction in tax collections that
reduces the present value oftax collections relative
to its initial value. The tax authority
then encourages the central bank to adhere to a
k-percent rule for the monetary base for the indefi-
nite future. Such a monetary policy that the
central bank withholds seignorage revenues
the government. Given these the Presi-
dent and the Federal Reserve, the only plays open to
the government expenditure authority are ones that
capitulate to the President's objective and that
reduce the present value of government eXJ)endi-
tures by an amount commensurate with the reduc-
tion in the present value oftax collections. As
as the President and the Federal Reserve adhere to
their strategies, the stream ofg01,enrlment eXJ)euldi-
tures must be reduced because of the arithmetic of
the government budget restraint.
Congress may, however, reason as follows. Itcan
simply refuse to reduce the present value ofgovern-
ment expenditures despite the tax reduction
neered by the tax authority. as long as the
mcmetary authority refuses to monetize interest-
bearing government debt, the arithmetic of the
government budget constraint that the tax
authority eventually reverse itselfand raise taxes by
an amount that makes the present value of taxes
equal to the present value of plus
whatever debt has accumulated. If the monetary
authOl:1ty and Congress both refuse to chicken out,
then the arithmetic of the budget constraint asserts
that the onlyfeasible thing for the tax authority to do
is to raise taxes.
Of course, it is feasible that neither the taxauthority northe expenditure authority will chicken
out. In that case, the centralbankwould be forced to
chicken outbydeparting from its k-percent rule and
generating substantial seignorage. By monetizing
the debt, the central bankwould permitgovernment
expenditures to exceed tax collections in present
value terms, albeit at the cost of generating infla-
tion.
While the authorities are playing this game of
chicken, we would observe large net-of-interest
government deficits, low rates of monetization of
governmentdebt (low growth rates for the monetary
base), and maybe also high real interest rates on
government debt. The result of high real interest
rates on government debt and the net-of-interest
government deficit is a growing real value of the
stock of interest-bearing government debt. The ris-
ing stockofthis debtwouldbe a signal thatthe game
is not yet over, in the sense that there has been
insufficient capitulation. In the U.S. today, the real
stock of interest-bearing federal debt continues to
grow in relation to GNP.
The game ofchicken interpretation has a number
ofmerits as an explanation ofthese events. While it
is tempting to criticize resorting to a game of
chickenas an inferiorway torun agovernment, such
criticism ignores the extensive decentralization
across time and institutions that exists under U.S.
government. Given the limited power assigned to
the Presidency for economic policy in general and
government expenditures in particular, resorting to
the game ofchicken may be the best method avail-
able for achieving the preference, reflected in
Reagan's policies, for reducing the size ofthe U.S.
government.
Several important macroeconomic policyevents
during the Reagan years bear interpretations in
terms of one party or another in our game of
chickening out. The Federal Reserve partly chick-
end outon two occasions, one in August 1982, and
another at the start of 1985. Each time, the Fed was
responding to outside pressures that were partly
consequences of, and which in tum fed back upon,
the original game ofchicken.
InAugust 1982, the Fed substantially eased mon-
etary policy, increasing the growth ofnarrow mone-
tary aggregates and driving real interestrates down-
ward. These actions were in large part responses to
the international debt crisis that coincided with the
high real interest rates associated with the game of
chicken thatdominated U.S. macropolicy. The Fed
eased its monetary policy specifically in response to
the Mexican crisis and the threat it posed for U.S.
financial stability. Such concerns limit the Fed's
ability to continue to playatight monetary policy in
the face of continued net-of-interest U.S. govern-
ment budget deficits.
The second partial capitulation by the Fed was
associated with a move starting in early 1985 to
lower real interest rates in the U.S. as a device to
drive down the value of the dollar. The Fed was
responding to the increasing strength ofprotection-
ist pressures in the U.S. that were themselves
responses to the U.S. trade deficit which was, in
turn, one consequence of the string of government
deficits associated with the game ofchicken.
m. Conclusion
While they differ in a numberofrespects, ourtwo
alternative rationalizations of the Reagan deficits
share the premise that, compared to the pre-Reagan
path, U.S. federal expenditures are destined to fall.
In Barro's model, the fall in the path ofexpenditures
occurs exogenously, and precipitates the Reagan
deficits via optimal tax smoothing. In Wallace's
view, the fall in the path of federal expenditures
relative to the pre-Reagan path is an outcome of
(or "reward to") the game of "chicken", with an
endless string of prospective budget deficits being
the stick by which the President and Federal Reserve
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persuade a reluctant Congress to reduce federal
expenditures. According to bothexplanations, large
net-of-interest deficits are signals of prospective
surpluses to be achieved via reductions in expendi-
ture.
Eachrationalization relies onthe looseness ofthe
intertemporal government budget constraint to
which I referred at the beginning of the paper. A
long stringoflarge deficits is consistentwith budget
balance provided that sufficient surpluses occur
later. We have rationalized the large Reagan deficits
by appealing to the ideathat they are temporary andbound to be replaced by surpluses long before they
damage the economy.
Some readers may find the entire endeavor of
rationalizing the large Reagan deficits to be mis-
placed. Perhaps it is farfetched to rationalize deficits
in the ways that we have, and better to regard them
simply as reflecting shortsighted mistakes that the
U.S. is bound to pay for in the future via more
inflation, increased financial fragility, or higher
taxes. Nevertheless, to reach the conclusionthat the
deficits of the last five years were mistakes, One
must first understand the arguments that could
rationalize them.
ApPENDIX
We describe linear-quadratic versions ofthe mod-
els ofHall (1978) and Barro (1979). The exposition
is designed to highlight parallels between the two
models. For further details and implications of the
models, see Sargent (1987).
Hall's Model
A representative consumer chooses a contingency
planfor (ctYr=o to maximize
where ctis consumption at t, Etis the mathematical
expectation operator conditioned on information
known to the consumer at t, and u is a one-period
utility function given by
whereuo, uI'U2> O. Theobjective(H1)is maximized
withrespectto(cl'At+I)~=o subject to the
sequence ofbudget constraints
(H3) At+ 1 =R[At+ Yt-Ct],t=O,I,...
Aogiven
where R "" 1 is the gross rate of return on savings
between periods t and t+ I, At is assets (indebted-
ness, if negative), and Yt is noncapital or labor
income at t. We assume that Yt is a given stochastic
process, outsidethe agent's control. We assume that
f3R = 1. We assume that (Yt) is astochastic process
that satisfies j ~1)1 Etf3
j Yt + j = 0 for all t. We
impose upon assets the condition
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(H4) Eo At "" M > - 00 forallt
which rules out a strategy of larger and larger
borrowing to support bliss consumption. Subject to
H4, the solution ofthe difference equationH3 is the
following intertemporal version of the budget con-
straint:
Equation H5 states that the expected present value
ofconsumptionequals the expectedpresent value of
labor income plus the value ofinitial assets At.
Hall shows that a first order necessary condition
associated with the problem of maximizing HI
subject to H5 is Etu'(ct+ I) = (f3R) IU'(Ct). Since
we have set f3R = 1, this becomes Etu'(ct+ I) =
u'(ct). With utility given by H2, this in turn implies
I;ct+ I = ct, so thatconsumption is arandom walk.
Barro's Model
A government chooses a tax collection sequence
(Tt)r'=O to maximize
00
(Bl) - E t:o f3t L(Tt),O< f3 < 1
where Tt are total tax revenues, and L is the loss
function
The maximization is carried out subject to the
sequence of government budget constraintsWe impose the boundary condition
00
EIJ, -jTt+J,=BI+E k R-jg ,
I j=O t+J
FOOTNOTES
1. Sargent and Wallace (1981) describe some of the
implications of the interdepE";ndence between monetary
and fiscal policy.
2. This is Sargent and Wallace's unpleasant monetarist
3. See the Appendix for a more formal presentation and
comparison of Hall's and Barro's models.
4. See Kydland and Prescott (1977) for a discussion ofthe
time-inconsistency problem in macroeconomics. See
Lucas andStokey [1983J for a study of dynamic inconsis-
tency in the context of an optimal tax smoothing model that
shares many features with Barro's model.
5. See Sargent's (1987) chapteron dynamic optimal taxa-
tion for an extended example exploring the time-inconsis-
tency phenomenon created by the responsiveness of
investment to anticipations of future taxes.
6. Wallace advanced his ideas orally in March 1981 dur-
ing discussionsthat laterled to ourco-authoring "Unpleas-
ant Monetarist Arithmetic" (1981).
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert J. 1979, "On the Determination ofthe Public
Debt," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87 (1979),
pp.940-951.
Friedman, Milton. A Theory of the Consumption Function.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
Friedman, Milton. A Program For Monetary Stability. New
York: Fordham University Press, 1959.
Hall, Robert E. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle -
Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evi-
dence," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, NO.6
(1978).
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott. "Rules Rather
than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,"
JournalofPolitical Economy, Vol. 85, NO.3 (1977), pp.
473-491.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., and Nancy Stokey. "Optimal Mone-
tary and Fiscal Policy in an EconomyWithout Capital,"
Journal ofMonetary Economics, Vol. 12, NO.1 (1983),
pp.55-94.
Sargent, Thomas J. Macroeconomic Theory. 2nd Ed. Aca-
demic Press, 1987.
Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. "Some UnpleClsant
Monetarist Arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall 1981.
+ gt - Ttl, t=O, 1, ...
~ M < + 00 forallt
and gl is government expen-
ditures at t. Government expenditures are taken
to be an exogenous stochastic process that satisfies
= ofor aH t.
EquationB5 states thatthe expectedpresentvalue of
tax collections equalsthe sumofthe currentvalue of
debt plus the expected present value ofgovernment
expenditures. The government is assumed to maxi-
mize B1 subject to B5 by choosing a strategy for
setting(Tt)'f 0, taking Bo and the stochastic
process for gl as given. Assume as in Hall's model
that I3R=l.
Mathematically, Barro's model is equivalent to
Simply replace ct in Hall's model with Tt in
Barro's, Yt in Han's model with gt in Barra's, At in
Hall's with BtinBarro's, (uo, Ul, uz)inHall's model
with (0, - vJ, vz) in Barra's. Itimmediately follows
from Hall's results that the optimal tax collection
strategy in Barro's model satisfies Et 7t+ J = 7t, so
that tax collections are a random walk.
which rnles out a strategy of "never tax, always
borrow more." Subject to B4, the solution of the
difference B3 is the intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint
12